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Abstract
Rapidly evolving technology and tight coupling of physical sensors and actuation with the
system behind it in Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) have opened up new forms of security
vulnerabilities to adversaries. These new types of attacks on the physical (PHY) layer
can be used to drive the system in an undesired, unstable state which could ultimately
resolve in life-threatening consequences for users. This new research-area has gained trac-
tion in the CPS community recently, but a feasible solution has yet to be found. One
problem with the current approach of proposing algorithms and counter-measures against
such attacks is, that it can be hard to compare different works in terms of effectiveness
and computational cost as every research group has different ways of providing results.
This work introduces SecUAV, common testbed for the CPS community. SecUAV uti-
lizes OpenUAV, an open-source UAV simulator, for providing a common testbed for the
fair evaluation of secure state estimation algorithms. This is achieved by expanding
the already existing functionality with a framework allowing to simulate different kinds
of attacks and to deploy different secure CPS algorithms. The feasibility of SecUAV is
demonstrated by deploying three works in it, and comparing the resulting data in a fair
manner. One of the studies algorithms, ReCaP [1], has been developed and evaluated by
SecUAV during the work on this thesis.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Status quo and the importance PHY level security
The last decades have witnessed rapid development and evolution of various technical
fields, one of which are Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). CPS are characterized by a close
integration of physical and software components utilizing both to operate. One example
would be Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) offering many advantages and services in
industry, home automation, military operations, homeland security, emergency and rescue
and habitat monitoring. It typically consists of a set of distributed nodes, equipped with
sensors and communication equipment, to monitor and communicate the state of the
network [2]. Another example are current, and future, vehicles, which are becoming
”smarter” everyday, providing a system capable of sensing its surroundings and taking
necessary control actions [3]. The current trend in this matter is to move from a typical,
isolated, control system to open automotive architectures which would enable new services
such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication or Over The Air (OTA) software updates to
improve the reliability and quality of such systems [4,5].
Due its nature, attacks on CPS may have life threatening consequences as they are able
to actuate within physical spaces. An example of the recent past, of how vulnerable
such systems can be, is the Stuxnet attack on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions
(SCADA) controllers for industrial processes [6,7]. It has further be shown [8–10], that
today’s vehicles can be exploited and are not resilient against attacks. An attacker there-
fore may be able to disrupt the system and critical components of the car. In the future,
self driving cars will become widely available and more sophisticated than they are today,
giving the problem even more importance [11]. Even more dangerous than compromised
self driving cars, a military drone operating under the control of an adversary can be a
powerful and deadly weapon [12,13]. Lastly, spoofing GPS signals to misdirect vehicles off
course [14] or to take over an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) [15] can result in damages
to humans and equipment alike. Further, other types of attacks on a variety of cyber
physical systems have been shown in [16–18].
To protect against such attacks, a paradigm shift in security needs to happen, as tradi-
tional – cryptographic based – mechanisms do not provide sufficient protection. These
techniques cannot protect against physically compromised signals or a manipulated en-
vironment around the sensor node. To solve this problem, researchers aim to tackle the
problem with secure state estimation [19] where the target is to accurately estimate the
system’s state out of corrupted measurements. Another approach is intrusion detection
of sensors, actuators and communication network attacks.
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1.2. The need for a unified CPS Security framework
With these issues in mind, researchers throughout the CPS community started and tried to
find a solution to these problems with various applications in mind. Several propositions
have been made to close these vulnerabilities, but the problem lies in comparing them.
Different researchers usually have different approaches of showing that their solution is
feasible for solving the problem at hand, CPS security (e.g. by means of MATLAB
simulations, convergence analysis, implementation on a custom testbed, etc.). The issue,
for industry and academics alike, arises when trying to find out if one of the many proposed
approaches would work for a given system. As the process of getting results varies greatly
from paper to paper, it can be hard, especially for those without a strong background in
programming, to fairly compare the different approaches in order to find the best suitable
for a given application. This is especially important, considering that the services offered
by CPS require strict timing constraints and accurate estimates during operation. Further,
CPS usually have power consumption constraints [20], limitations in used bandwidth [21],
computation limitations [22] and generally very limited resources available for counter
mechanisms. Therefore a unified framework for fairly evaluating proposals is the key to
enable rapid development of efficient and reliable secure state estimators.
This thesis is therefore split into four parts:
 Revision of OpenUAV and introduction of the newly proposed SecUAV .
 Overview of three proposed solutions to the issue which are going to be fairly com-
pared.
 Implementation, measurements and simulation of these three works in the proposed
framework.
 Analysis of the obtained results and discussion of the process.
It has to be noted, that part of work related to this thesis was devoted in configuring
and programming SecUAV as well as work on ReCaP [1] (mainly development of the
algorithm and evaluation in SecUAV). This work is not explicitly mentioned throughout
this document.
1.3. Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 introduces the notation and terminology used throughout this work before
explaining the problem statement and a brief background of localization. The simulation
environment and SecUAV are discussed and explained in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4
provides the reader with a summary of the three secure state estimator proposals con-
sidered in this work. The specific case studies and results are discussed in Chapter 5,
before providing a conclusion and outlook in Chapter 6.
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1.4. Notation and terminology
Throughout this thesis, the transpose of a matrix and vector are denoted by AT and xT,
respectively, while A−1 denotes the inverse of a matrix. The n×n identity matrix is given
by In, a row or column vector of size n containing all ones or zeros is denoted by 1n and
0n, respectively. In general, the estimation of a magnitude x is denoted by xˆ. Further,
A•B represents the element wise product of vectors or matrices. For a set S, |S| denotes
its cardinality and for sets S and R, S\R corresponds to the elements of S, that are not
in R. The complement of a set K ⊂ S is given by KC = S\K. The ith element of a vector
xk is either given by x
i
k or xk,i, depending on the context. Additionally, |x| and |A| denote
a vector and matrix, whose elements are the absolute values of x and A, respectively. For
matrices P and Q, P  Q specifies that the matrix P is element-wise smaller or equal to
Q. Furthermore, for a vector e ∈ Rp, the support of the vector is given by the set
supp (e) = {i∣∣ei 6= 0} ⊆ {1 , 2 , . . . , p} ,
and the l0 norm is the size of supp (e), i.e. ‖e‖l0 = |supp (e)|. Lastly, the l0 norm of a
matrix E is defined as ‖E‖l0 = |rowsupp (E)|, where
rowsupp (E) = {i∣∣E′i 6= 0} ⊆ {1 , 2 , . . . , p} ,
with E′i corresponding to the rows of the matrix E.
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2. Problem statement
The specific problem statement, is being described in more detail in the following section.
Afterwards, a brief introduction to localization will be given as it will serve as a basis for
the chosen works explained in Chapter 4 as well as the test cases studied in Chapter 5.
This chapter further aims to give the reader a better understanding on the choices made
with regard to simulator and SecUAV.
2.1. Overall problem
With the rise of autonomous systems (e.g. self-driving cars, industry automation, UAVs,
etc.) crucial aspects of the operation of such CPS are based on readings from various
sensors (e.g. sonar, RADAR, LiDAR). This opens up a new vulnerability in these kind of
systems for potential adversaries – seeking to drive the system into an undesirable state –
by manipulating the readings, a firmware (or operating system) receives from the sensors.
This can be achieved, for example, by physically tampering with sensors, like positioning
an object statically in front of a RADAR antenna, or injecting false information directly
in the sensor feed (i.e. a man-in-the-middle attack).
Generally, the firmware uses these readings to estimate a state, enabling the system to be
modeled as a non-linear time varying system as
xi+1 = F (xi) + ni
yi = H(xi) + vi
, (2.1)
where xi is the state and yi is the measurements vector out of the attacked sensors at
time i of size n ∈ R and m ∈ R, respectively. F : Rn → Rn and H : Rn → Rm are the
state- and output update function, respectively. The process and measurement noise are
denoted by zero-mean Gaussian random variables ni and vi, where Qi and Ri are the
process noise and the measurement noise covariance matrices at time i, respectively.
If an attacker chooses to tamper with the measurements yi at any given time, this might
yield in a (wrongfully) estimated state xˆi and therefore could result in catastrophic conse-
quences for the CPS. Researchers therefore try to find means of nullifying such attacks in
a way, that the actual state of the system can be recovered regardless of it being tampered
with or not. This is commonly modeled by modifying (2.1) to read
x˜i+1 = F (x˜i) + ni
y˜i = H(x˜i) + vi + ai
, (2.2)
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where ai corresponds to an attack at time step i. Modeling the attack as an additive
term for the measurements yi, enables to model a malicious node (i.e. the node directly
reporting false readings) or corrupted link (e.g. via a man-in-the-middle attack).
Considering (2.1) being the uncompromised system yielding in correct state estimates xˆ,
the goal of a secure state estimator (i.e. secure CPS algorithm) is to obtain the true state
out of the system (2.2) in case a 6= 0m. Of course it should also be able to identify that
the system is not under attack if a = 0m, i.e.
ˆ˜x = xˆ ∀ a ∈ Rm , (2.3)
as long as the sensor readings (without attack in (2.2)) are the same for both systems.
Naturally, such general systems can handle a variety of applications, for example, local-
ization, time synchronization, control and tracking of system parameters (such as position
of a part of a robot, velocity, acceleration, etc.) or advanced models. This, inevitably,
leads to proposed CPS algorithms to be able to handle just as many different problems.
Thus, common metrics can be hard to clarify and a fair comparison of different works
can be a difficult task to achieve. This work therefore defines two metrics being used to
obtain a fair comparison:
 Estimation error: The difference between the actual state of the system (ground
truth) and the estimated state.
 Execution time: The time needed to estimate the system’s state per time step
based on the measurements received up until the current iteration.
This thesis therefore aims to offer a solution to the problem of not being able to compare
different works in a fair and easy way, by providing a framework to achieve this task with
these metrics in mind.
2.2. Localization
As discussed in Section 2.1, problems considered by different secure CPS algorithms cover
a variety of forms and applications. In an attempt to not shift the focus of this work on
the specific applications of the discussed algorithms, one common issue is picked, serving
as the underlying problem that needs to be solved.
The chosen application serving as a basis for the fair comparison therefore is localization
of an object (car, UAV, robot, sensor, etc.) in a defined region (e.g. a room, warehouse,
open field). This task can be accomplished by a multitude of ways, a common approach is
to obtain distance measurements to/from objects at known locations (anchors) and using
these to triangulate the position of the object in the global reference frame.
It is important to note, that localization problems are usually non-linear systems with
regard to (w.r.t.) the distance measurements. As there is very little work on secure CPS
algorithms available – at the moment of writing this thesis – being able to deal with non-
linear problems, an additional, linear formulation, based on [23], has been implemented.
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Both approaches will be explained in the following after a brief introduction on how to
obtain distance measurements.
2.2.1. Obtaining distance measurements
Measuring the distance to an object can be done in a multitude of ways, these mechanisms
are divided into two categories, active and passive, for the remainder of this work to ease
understanding.
2.2.1.1. Active measurements
Active measurements require the object to which the distance shall be determined to
be involved in the process. This includes, for example, a base station, another car or
UAV which either transmits information periodically (beacons) or when inquired by the
mobile node which would like to know the distance. Common mechanisms in this category
include:
 Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI): In this case, an anchor periodi-
cally broadcasts its own location to its surroundings, a receiving entity can use the
strength of the received signal to estimate its distance to the anchor. This approach
requires knowledge of the wireless channel on which the signal is transmitted for
accurately estimating the range [24].
 Time Of Arrival (TOA): In this case, an anchor sends a packet including a time
stamp in a periodic manner, or when requested. The target then uses the included
time and the time of arrival to determine the air time, and ultimately the distance,
the packet has traveled. This approach suffers accuracy in case the two systems do
not have a perfectly aligned clock [25].
 Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA): Like TOA, TDOA is based on the air
time of packets. This approach however usually starts with the mobile node to
start a chain of communication which usually includes two to four messages to be
exchanged. This allows both, anchor and node, to determine their ranges from each
other. Further, due to the mechanism the ranges are obtained, clock synchronization
issues cause less of a concern than for TOA [25].
While the Global Positioning System (GPS) is part of this type of measurements as well,
as satellites periodically send signals used for triangulation by the mobile node, it is not
further studied or used in the remainder of this work. The reason for this choice is, that
although its capabilities are well studied and proven, attacks on this system have been
shown in [14,15]. Further, devices equipped with a GPS receiver require significantly more
space and energy compared to the remaining sources of active distance measurements.
Even though this does not pose a problem in systems like cars, boats or airplanes the
compromises required by incorporating GPS into sensor networks or other forms of energy
sensitive and space limited systems may not be possible to be made for such solutions [25].
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2.2.1.2. Passive measurements
On the other hand, passive ways of determining a distance to an object only require the
mobile node to conduct measurements without interaction of an anchor or other obstacles.
This is useful if anchors, or obstacles, can not interact with the environment or it is not
feasible to do so, examples include: walls, trees, the ground or landmarks. Using passive
measurements can also be of interest if the other party is not trusted because it is known to
falsify active measurements. Technologies in this category include laser, RADAR, LiDAR
and sonar. All of these technologies rely on sending a signal and measuring the time it
takes for it to arrive back at the mobile node’s receiver in order to determine the distance
to an object.
2.2.2. Nonlinear approach
Regardless of how measurements are obtained, the task of actually determining the loca-
tion of a mobile node is a nonlinear problem with regard to the acquired ranges in the form
of (2.1). An commonly applied approach is to use the conducted data for triangulation
in which the distances serve as radii of circles (2D) or spheres (3D) with the center being
the known locations of the anchors. The point in which all intersect is the position of the
mobile node. This requires three or four measurements, for 2D and 3D, respectively, to
obtain a unique solution [25] which can be seen in Figure 2.1 for the 2D case.
r0 r1
r2
A0 A1
A2
Figure 2.1.: Using distance measurements from three anchors to determine the 2D-
position of a mobile node (red) by triangulation.
If the distances to the anchors are subject to noise, or if the clock sources are not perfectly
synchronized (in case of TOA, TDOA) the result is, however, not a single point, but an
area in which the target lies (c.f. Figure 2.2a). In this case it can further happen, that
the circles (or spheres) do not intersect or at least span a general area in which the node
could lie (depicted in Figure 2.2b).
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A0
A1 A2
(a)
A0
A1 A2
(b)
Figure 2.2.: Noisy readings on the distance measurements between mobile node (red) and
anchors Ai can yield in (a) a general area (gray) in which the node could lie or
(b) no solution at all, as the circles spanned by the readings do not intersect
at the same point, nor span an overlapping area.
Using TOA for 2D localization of one mobile node determining its distance to three
anchors (base stations) at known locations, the authors of [25] showed that the problem
can be formulated as
[
x2 y2
x3 y3
] [
xm
ym
]
=
1
2
[
(x22 + y
2
2)
2 − r22 + r21
(x23 + y
2
3)
2 − r23 + r21
]
, (2.4)
where ri is the measured distance from node m to anchor i ∈ [1, 3], xj and yj are the
known 2D-locations for anchors j ∈ [2, 3] and [xm, ym]T is the unknown position of the
mobile node. This formulation is based on the assumption that the first anchor is located
at the origin [x1, y1]
T = [0, 0]T.
Rewriting (2.4) as
H x = b , (2.5)
with
H =
[
x2 y2
x3 y3
]
, x =
[
xm
ym
]
, b =
1
2
[
(x22 + y
2
2)
2 − r22 + r21
(x23 + y
2
3)
2 − r23 + r21
]
. (2.6)
allows to formulate the least-squares solution to (2.4) as
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xˆ =
(
HT H
)−1
HT b . (2.7)
It can be clearly seen that the ranges ri are included in the problem (2.4) and the solution
(2.7) in a quadratic manner, therefore the system can not be modeled linearly but only
in the nonlinear form (2.1).
2.2.3. Linear localization
Most secure CPS algorithms are currently only able to deal with linear systems in the
form
xi+1 = A xi + ni
yi = C xi + vi
, (2.8)
with A and C being the state and output update matrices, respectively. A linearization
of the problem has therefore been applied in an attempt to be able to fairly compare
the different approaches regardless. One way of achieving this is to use polyhedra based
localization, as it is described in [23]. The idea behind this approach is to use discretely
sampled circles (forming a polyhedra, see Figure 2.3a) instead of the circle itself (as
described before) for the localization of a mobile node.
p0
p1p2
p3
p4 p5
(a)
A x ≤ b1
A x ≤ b2
x
y
(b)
Figure 2.3.: Discretization of a circle by a 6 sided polygon (a) and polyhedron discretiza-
tion with two different vectors b and fixed A (b).
A polyhedron is the intersection of n half spaces and can be represented as
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P (A,b) = {z = (x, y) ∈ R2∣∣A z ≤ b} with A =
a
T
1
...
aTn
 , b =
b1...
bn
 , (2.9)
where A is the collection of the unit normal vectors and b the offsets of the polyhedron,
respectively. While A represents the shape of the polyhedron, the location and scale are
determined by the vector b, which can be seen in Figure 2.3b.
In the case of localization, m anchors are used to determine the position of the target
node. Hence, a set of m circles can be discretized into m polyhedra, constructed by Ai
and bi for i ∈ [1,m]. The intersection of the m polyhedra creates another polyhedron
PT =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2∣∣A¯ z ≤ b¯} with A¯ =
A1...
Am
 , b¯ =
b1...
bn
 , (2.10)
representing the intersection of the m other ones. The target location xˆ = (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ R2
now lies within PT, which can be obtained by solving
xˆ = argmin
xˆ
‖A¯ zˆT − b¯‖22 . (2.11)
The least-squares solution to this problem is
xˆ =
(
A¯T A¯
)−1
A¯T b¯ . (2.12)
As the distances to the anchor nodes are now encoded, linearly, solely in b¯, the solution
(2.12) can be represented as a linear system (2.8).
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Evaluating algorithms on actual hardware (e.g. RC-car, car, UAV, etc.) is undoubtedly
a necessary task in order to ultimately prove feasibility of a proposed solution on the
target architecture. Before actually moving to an implementation on it, it is advisable
to first run simulations in a setting closely resembling the target architecture. However,
as – especially while the implementation is still under development – bugs might result
in a high bill to pay if things do not go as planned (e.g. a car crashing into another one
or an UAV flying into an obstacle). To avoid such situations, a number of simulation
environments have been developed in the recent past allowing to simulate robots and
cars alike. Along autonomous cars, UAVs have become increasingly popular over the
last decade, especially because, due to their design, they allow to fulfill tasks such as
steady photography, hovering, deployment of sensors and many more, which can hardly
be achieved by a traditional helicopter or fixed wing vehicles.
Due to both fields being very active research topics in academia as well as industry,
environments which simulate either have been investigated for their capabilities and one
has been chosen as a starting point to develop SecUAV . This chapter is organized as
follows, in Section 3.1 requirements of the final environment are introduced and three
different simulators are briefly presented and Section 3.2 motivates and explains the details
of the finally chosen environment, lastly Section 3.3 introduces SecUAV and explains its
architecture, capabilities and extensions.
3.1. Candidates
3.1.1. Requirements
Before presenting the three candidates to serve as a basis for this work, the key aspects
on which the final choice has been based shall be discussed. Firstly and probably most
importantly, as the aim is to extend a given implementation it is necessary for its code
to be open source. Closed source systems would greatly increase the complexity of
the proposed solution and limit flexibility. Another important point is simplicity of the
platform – in terms of usage – so that not much previous knowledge is needed for setting
up the system, preferably this just necessitates the end-user to download a package and
execute a simple chain of commands to be able to start a simulation. This last point
further implies a well documented and, ideally, feature rich API to ease extension as
well as cross-platform compatibility so that the barrier of entry is further reduced. The
ideal candidate should further offer access to a variety of sensors (e.g. RADAR, LiDAR,
GPS, laser, Gyrometer, etc.) or should at the very least facilitate easy implementation
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of new sensors. Lastly, in order to be the most flexible in terms of target applications,
platoon driving of multiple cars or flying of more than one drone should be supported.
Simply put, a flexible, cross-platform open-source platform, which is well documented and
supports a variety of target applications by offering to interface a multitude of sensors
and simulations of more than one vehicle at a time would be the perfect candidate.
3.1.2. CARLA
CARLA [26] is a simulation framework built on top the Unreal Engine 4 (UE4) which
takes care of computing the physics and graphics of the simulation. As the name suggests,
the goal is to provide an environment to simulate autonomous cars. At the time of writing
this thesis, CARLA is under heavy development, therefore, unfortunately, its capabilities
are rather limited, not many sensors are available (currently only several cameras as well
as LiDAR have been implemented). A further limitation is, that it is currently not possible
to simulate more than one autonomous car in the same simulation, making it not possible
to simulate platoon driving scenarios. Ultimately, the usage of distributed algorithms,
where multiple cars work together on a problem, is not possible at the current state of
the project.
3.1.3. Apollo
Apollo [27], like CARLA, is a framework built for autonomous cars, with the ultimate goal
of deploying developed applications directly into a self-driving car. For this purpose it is
built on top of an extended version the Robot Operating System (ROS), called RTOS. Due
to its heavy industry support, multiple sensors are currently available, for both simulation
and deployment. As the system is meant to be actively deployed into a car the project is
naturally extensive and not necessarily easy to understand and/or adapt.
3.1.4. OpenUAV
OpenUAV [28] is built on top of ROS, alongside other software, as well. It aims to
provide an easy to use platform for researchers and students to simulate UAVs. Due to
its underlying software, it supports a multitude of sensors and is very flexible in regards
of extensions. Further, it supports the simulation of multiple UAVs at once, enabling to
study more complex scenarios like UAVs flying in formation. Additionally, like Apollo,
the platform aims to be deployable to actual hardware, so that a simulated scenario, once
giving satisfying results, can be directly tested on real UAVs without much modification.
3.1.5. Comparison
With the three simulation environments briefly explained and the defined set of require-
ments in Section 3.1.1, it is possible to choose a platform to build SecUAV on top of.
The comparison is summarized in Table 3.1 and shows that all three candidates support
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Table 3.1.: Comparison of the three target simulators against the requirements identified.
CARLA Apollo OpenUAV
Open-Source
Cross-Platform 1
Simplicity
Documentation
Rich API
Number of Sensors Few Many Many
Platoon Driving N/A2
Flexibility
most of the requirements, but both self-driving car platforms (CARLA and Apollo) are
either too complex (Apollo) to allow a simple start or do not support many sensors and/or
platoon driving (CARLA).
In light of these results, the decision ultimately fell on OpenUAV to be the target plat-
form on top of which SecUAV shall be built. An additional advantage of OpenUAV in
comparison to CARLA and Apollo is that it does not require a powerful back-end server
to communicate with in order to run simple simulations. Therefore it allows researchers,
and especially students, to run simple scenarios locally, rather than having to rely on
powerful and expensive infrastructure.
3.2. OpenUAV
As indicated before, UAVs are of growing interest for industry, academics, the robots- and
CPS communities due to their capabilities. Compared to helicopters, UAVs, or multi-
rotors, allow precise movement and steady hovering with comparable simpler hardware
and mechanics. All these capabilities come with a price though, a small mistake can
easily yield a very expensive damage to the UAV, for example by flying into a building
or tree. Since the hardware can be rather expensive, algorithms deployed on such devices
should be bug free, since trial and error is not an option, especially when using an indoor
environment.
The authors of [28] created OpenUAV in order to provide a framework that allows de-
velopment of algorithms directly on the target platform without having to take the risk
of destroying it. They further aim to thereby setting the ground stone for university
courses dealing with UAVs, as their system enables a low barrier of entry to students and
researchers alike. No powerful PC is required and if a mistake is made the results are just
a learning experience, as no damage is done to expensive hardware.
The basis for OpenUAV is formed bye ROS [29] and MAVROS [30], which allows great
1It is worth noting, that a server/client architecture was chosen for CARLA, both of which can be used
on different systems.
2No information has been found that suggests whether this functionality is supported.
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flexibility, a big community and the support to deploy the system directly on supported
hardware. The flexibility is given by the concept of nodes (one component, e.g. a sensor,
corresponds to one or more nodes) which communicate via topics (a URI like concept).
For the simulation itself, Gazebo [31] is used as physics and visualization engine. Lastly,
a modified version of PX4 [32], a popular autopilot, is used to further simplify the control
of the UAV. For example, the user may hand the flight controller a set of way points
and PX4 takes care of controlling the rotors and remaining hardware of the UAV to fly
to them. Additionally, Schmittle et al. designed OpenUAV in a Container as a Service
(CaaS) architecture by utilizing Docker [33], therefore allowing it to run on all common
operating systems. A more detailed explanation on the utilized frameworks and tools is
given in Appendix A.1 and has been omitted here to enhance the readability.
3.2.1. Simulation environment
As already discussed, the developers of OpenUAV meant to create an easy to use platform
with minimal barrier of entry, so that more people can conduct UAV research and courses
without having to spend a fortune on specialized and fragile hardware. The remainder
of this section is devoted to describing the architecture of OpenUAV and on how the
components described so far play together in the big picture. Lastly, entry-points for the
extension are shown and discussed. A short outlook on further capabilities of OpenUAV
is given in Appendix A.2 to highlight the variety of applications that can be realized with
this simulation tool; further strengthening the reasoning behind choosing it over CARLA
and Apollo.
3.2.1.1. Architecture
OpenUAV is composed of three major components, the core OpenUAV server hosting
the simulation, a front-end interface not necessarily hosted on the same system and the
communication mechanism allowing the two previous components to communicate as well
as providing the communication structure for the user to communicate with the front-end.
Each of those is described in the following.
Additionally, the OpenUAV architecture allows for full Software In The Loop (SITL)
simulations, where everything is being simulated right on the system that it is running
on. It further supports Hardware In The Loop (HITL), for which the simulation does
not run on some server or workstation, but directly on the target hardware. HITL can
be especially useful in order to determine performance bounds and limitations. Due to
one simulation requiring one target platform however, this goes against the scalability and
cloud principles aimed for by the authors (e.g. increasing awareness of an UAV simulation
environment to drive researchers and students alike to this area, not everyone has several
UAVs – connected together – sitting in a data center for running simulations). Therefore,
the focus in this work is on SITL, as it is one of the main objectives of OpenUAV.
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OpenUAV Server Component
In order to achieve maximum flexibility in both terms of host systems as well as scenarios
and hardware, OpenUAV utilizes the software stack composed of Docker, ROS (with
MAVROS), Gazebo and a modified version of PX4 (OpenUAV Firmware [34]). This is
done by combining all of these systems into one docker container (openuav1 henceforth)
as can be seen in Figure 3.1. By doing so, one container can be instantiated whenever
a simulation is run, as one container usually corresponds to a single simulation, and
destroyed when the simulation is finished.
By choosing this architecture for OpenUAV, the developers were able to provide complete
isolation of the simulation testbed with the communication and front-end components by
forwarding simulation data to ports of each container which can then be accessed on
these ports. This CaaS architecture allows for maximum efficiency and flexibility, as
resources are only occupied when they’re really needed. Further this allows scaling of a
cluster should there be the need for more simulations at the same time. Additionally,
should an end-user decide to setup the whole framework locally, no complex installations
of dependencies and tools is necessary, everything that is needed for this container is
provided by a single dockerfile.
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
World/Drone Models
Launch Files
MAVLINK UAV Comm.
ROS Master
PX4
Simulation
Gzweb 
Visualization
Gazebo Simulator
MAVROS
User Program
RosBags rviz
ROS service/topic
ROS Tools
Docker Simulation Container
Forwarded Ports to Host
Infrastructure
App A
Bins/Libs
App B
Bins/Libs
App C
Bins/Libs
Container
Docker
Host OS
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
T
o
p
ic
 A
Figure 3.1.: The architecture of OpenUAV as a single docker container integrating ROS,
PX4 and Gazebo [28].
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Front-end Interface
The core container (openuav1 ) is supported by two other containers, one containing a
database for logging and supporting the third container which is a django based dashboard
so that the simulation can be observed in real time by the means of a simple browser (c.f.
Figure 3.2). These two containers are responsible for user authentication, and serve as a
clean interface to the simulation container(s). In addition to visualization, the front-end
provides a terminal which can be used for debugging.
In case of the deployment done by the authors of [28], the front-end is hosted on the
Cyber-Physical Systems Virtual Organization (CPS-VO) [35] website.
Communication Component
One of the main contributions of OpenUAV is that it is cloud enabled. This means that a
user can access it anywhere, anytime, provided the system is deployed in the cloud. The
communication component is responsible for handling communication between the front-
end and the back-end simulation core, this is achieved via ssh, which is not a scalable form
of secure access. The communication between user and front-end satisfies the requirements
for cloud connectivity and is scalable. The two parts of the communication interface can
be seen in Figure 3.2, the user has to authenticate itself at the front-end interface while
the front-end itself authenticates on its own to the back-end, both these mechanisms make
use of SSL.
During the simulation, the back-end continuously sends information to the front-end in
order to display real-time video and sensor data to the user. Post-simulation ROSbags
(i.e. logs from ROS) are sent to the user by openuav1 for further evaluation once a
simulation is finished.
Summary
If deployed like Schmittle et al. meant it to be, the end user (i.e. student or researcher)
does not need to install any software on their machine, all they need to do is transfer
their scenario to a server hosting the OpenUAV platform. Once transferred, they send
a request to the web server to start a simulation, which in turn scales up an openuav1
container and the progress can be viewed through the web dashboard. This scheme can
be seen in Figure 3.2.
All of this enables a very low barrier of entry, as a scenario can be configured by means
of a simple shell script. If more than the already provided functionalities are needed for a
scenario, the user has the option to write their own ROS node in either C++ or Python,
therefore providing maximum flexibility. Furthermore, the CaaS architecture ensures that
the system is very adjustable in terms of deployment patterns, for example the system
can be deployed on a high performance server (i.e. ”the cloud”), scaling simulation (i.e.
core) containers as they are needed for simulations, or a user can choose to run the whole
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Figure 3.2.: The three components, master container, front-end and communication inter-
face, working together on a simulation [28]. One server component represents
one simulation, while the other two parts of the system do not need to be
scaled. The simulation can be observed remotely via a browser interface.
platform on their own workstation, if not too much computing power is needed for a
simulation.
3.2.1.2. Extendability
Having introduced the architecture of OpenUAV, the main question was, which ways
there are for integrating SecUAV into it. Due to the software stack OpenUAV is based
on, several points of entry have been identified, each having their own set of advantages
and disadvantages. The identified ways to extend OpenUAV are discussed and compared
in this section, before a final choice for SecUAV is made. The main requirements for it
are the ease of use and flexibility in terms of (programming) knowledge required by the
user and adaptiveness to different solutions w.r.t. different simulations, respectively.
Firmware
Possibly the first way of extending OpenUAV any developer would think of, is to modify
the Firmware itself. The biggest advantage with this way is, that changes can be made
at a very low level and can therefore be optimized the most so that they fit exactly what
has to be achieved. While this may sound very appealing, the disadvantages outweigh the
advantages by far. Because the firmware itself needs to be modified, each time a change is
made, the container needs to be re-created, which takes significantly more time than any
other approach, this further limits flexibility, as each feature needs to be implemented on
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this low level, the container needs to be re-created and further testing needs to be done
to be sure the firmware as a whole still works as expected. Because the work is done on
the firmware itself, the developer doing so needs to be very proficient in C++ and needs
to have an excellent understanding of a huge project, which limits this approach to only
excellent programmers, rather than people with limited experience in C++.
Gazebo and ROS
Another way to implement new changes on a slightly higher level than the modification
of the OpenUAV firmware, would be to change, adapt or add implementations of sensors
and actuators in ROS or Gazebo. This, again, would need a re-creation of the whole
container together with testing, verification and debugging of the changes. If the change
is done in Gazebo, this would also imply that the implementation has only been made
for the simulation environment, as Gazebo does not run on the target hardware, should
that be the aim of a user. If ROS is adapted, it would work on the hardware as well
as the simulation, depending on the capabilities of the hardware of course. Hence, each
change in Gazebo would also ultimately require the same change in ROS as well. The
main drawback – again – is that the user would need to be an expert programmer in order
to create these changes in feasible time.
ROS nodes
Due to the usage of MAVROS and PX4, it is possible to simply write a new node for
the software. This means that none of the underlying frameworks needs to be touched,
implying that the container does not need to be recreated as inclusion of custom nodes is
achieved during the startup phase of a simulation. This approach further allows the user to
operate on a high level in either Python or C++, further reducing the proficiency needed
to adapt a simulation. Therefore, making it possible to create new nodes that implement
a custom firmware, sensors, actuators and/or a (secure) CPS algorithm without having to
know the details of the underlying firmware. Therefore, writing a new node for each change
required, allows rapid development and testing as well as a very adaptive environment. If
one functionality is not needed for a simulation the node implementing it can simply be
removed or decoupled from that simulation, and re-used in another. No bloat is given to
the software as a whole as only required things stay in the final implementation, hence
keeping it simple.
A simplified visualization of this concept is depicted in Figure 3.3, where all main com-
ponents of the simulation are being taken care of by the master node. The master node
corresponds to the default functionality OpenUAV provides out of the box. Test cases and
additional functionality are defined and implemented in user nodes which communicate
with the master node at a given update rate.
Due to these reasons, it was decided to extend OpenUAV by providing a set of ROS
nodes that offer the functionality needed in a simple way. The disadvantage of having less
control in terms of fine tuning are exceeded by the advantages and comply the most with
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Figure 3.3.: The split between user and master space in one OpenUAV simulation in-
stance. The master node takes care of all main responsibilities of the simula-
tion, while user node(s) add additional functionality to the simulation.
our goal of providing an easy to use platform, enabling as many users as possible to use it
without having to read and study for days and weeks just to write a simple application.
3.3. SecUAV
Having discussed OpenUAV, its capabilities and possibilities offered by its modular design,
the main contribution of this thesis, SecUAV shall be introduced and its architecture,
features and goal will be explained. The design of this contribution aims to keep the
original goals of OpenUAV, as explained in Section 3.2, while also aiming to provide:
 A common framework for the CPS community to build, test and fairly compare
their solutions.
 A single point at which the user can define attacks and (secure) CPS algorithms.
 Pre-defined attacks on several sensor types.
 Sample implementations of secure CPS algorithms (see Chapter 4).
Ensuring that these points are still valid in the final implementation of the framework,
a toolbox for industry and research shall be provided, to compare and test different
proposals in a fair way. The idea of including pre-defined attacks in the package is
twofold, for once we would like to start a discussion in the community on how an attacker
on different systems can be accurately modeled (as there is currently no common model on
how to achieve this), and secondly, these pre-defined attacks – together with the sample
implementations of the algorithms in Chapter 4 – shall serve as an initial starting point
to users new to the platform, ensuring a rapid and steep learning curve in how to use and
expand the framework.
With these goals in mind, an architecture has been designed to offer the target functional-
ities while still being flexible enough to enable modifications and extensions in the future.
Therefore, the framework consists of three main modules all playing together when acti-
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vated. The configuration of these is done by a single configuration file. Namely, the three
modules are (i) a module acting as an adversary, pre-defined attacks can be enabled and
the user is given the option of implementing a custom attack type if the pre-defined ones
do not suffice for a scenario, (ii) a secure CPS algorithm module, which is the place where
users can deploy their secure algorithms for tests and evaluation and (iii) a configuration
module.
Before describing the modules included in SecUAV in detail, an overview of the whole
system and an explanation on how it interacts with the remainder of OpenUAV will be
given.
3.3.1. Overview
Considering the simplified view on OpenUAV’s architecture shown in Figure 3.3, it was
decided to implement SecUAV in between user- and master nodes, intercepting part of
the communication between both parts. It is important to note, that SecUAV is not a
separate part in this architecture, but part of the user nodes, as its configuration and
implementation is, ultimately, depended on the simulation being carried out. This can be
seen in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4.: SecUAV works as part of the user nodes, by intercepting the communication
between user and master nodes, attacking and securing the communication
by means of the attack framework and the deployed CPS algorithm.
Here, the attack and defense framework corresponds to SecUAV, as it is depicted in
Figure 3.4, the communication can be attacked in the forward (i.e. communication from
master to user node) as well as in the backwards (i.e. user node to master) paths, this
ensures maximum flexibility for types of attacks and counter measures. For example, an
adversary maybe attacks a sensor reading (forward path) or commands to an actuator
(backwards path), both these injections could potentially threaten the state of the UAV
and hence need to be considered by the framework.
3.3.2. Modules
The detailed forward path of SecUAV is shown in Figure 3.5, the user is able to configure
attacks (pre-defined and custom) and choose the secure CPS algorithm to be deployed.
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In order to ease the creation of a scenario before actually testing an implementation to
secure the communication, it is further possible to completely circumvent SecUAV by ma-
nipulating the corresponding entries in the configuration. This shall ease the development
of test scenarios. Further, it is possible to choose between the pre-defined attacks or, if
these are not what the user needs, to define a custom attack type along with the CPS
algorithm.
The same configuration is possible in the reverse path – although mirrored – and com-
pletely independent on the forward path. Additionally, the user can choose to deploy
different attacks or none at all on various links. For example, an adversary maybe found
a way to intercept a RADAR sensor, but can not fake measurements from a LASER range
finder. This again, shall allow maximum flexibility in terms of tested scenarios.
Predefined 
Attacks
Generic 
Attack
CPS
Algorithm
Type
Config File
Generic 
Config
Sensor Data User Node(s)
Measurements
Forward Path
Figure 3.5.: The forward path of SecUAV , attacks and security mechanisms can be config-
ured to act as the user needs them to. It is further possible to fully circumvent
either of these so that a direct, uninterrupted, communication between user
and master nodes is possible.
The communication between the different modules of the master node, framework and user
node(s) works by using ROS topics, therefore, for intercepting a message, the framework
subscribes to the topic which shall be attacked and publishes the attacked (and ultimately
secured) signal on another topic, which can then be used by either user or master node(s)
(depending on the direction of the attack).
Since the CPS algorithm module is nothing else than a ROS node providing the secure
algorithm to the framework, its discussion is omitted here, as the algorithms provided
are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The remaining functionality is similar for the attack
module (publishing, subscribing, etc.). Thus, the remainder of this section discusses pre-
defined and custom attacks and finishes with an explanation of the configuration of the
framework.
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3.3.3. Attacks
It has already been mentioned that the attack module is mainly composed of two submod-
ules, pre-defined and custom attacks. We were aiming to provide a generic set of attack
types in order to keep the usability for a rich set of sensors high. Before describing the
attack framework in detail, an attempt is been made to distinct two types of attackers.
3.3.3.1. Attack classification
In general, attackers in the presented framework are utilizing man-in-the-middle attacks
to corrupt sensor readings in an attempt to – ultimately – drive the UAVs in an undesired
state, i.e. bring them off their path or crash them. Attacks of this type, can be classified
into two main categories, type A and type B.
Type A attack
This type of attackers aim to stay undetected by the (secured) CPS, their approach is
to only inject sensor reading that would make sense with the system itself. For example,
if the corrupted sensor is a velocimeter of an UAV, injecting a reading of 100 m s−1 if
the previous (uncorrupted) measurement was 1 m s−1 would be easily detectable as an
attack, since a UAV would not be able to fly at such speeds nor accelerate as much in
a split-second. Instead, adversaries of this kind stick to the physical limitations of the
system and environment in an attempt to remain hidden from the system.
This can only be achieved if the attacker knows these physical limitations. Since OpenUAV
is, also, based on an open-hardware concept, availability of such information is a realistic
assumption. Therefore, such attacks would not raise suspicion in the CPS as they seem
just like uncorrupted signals from the system’s point of view.
Type B attack
On the contrary to type A attacks, type B adversaries do not care about being detected.
Therefore, they can inject whatever signals they seem fit to achieve their end-goal of
maximizing damage done to the system. An attacker of this kind, would inject a sensor
reading of 100 m s−1, even if it does not fit within the physical model and limitations of
the UAV.
In general, type B attacks are harder to defend against, as there are no constraints on
injected values. Furthermore, an attacker of this kind does not need to know the specifi-
cations of the system (e.g. datasheets of the used sensors), but – if known – this would
make this type of assault even more dangerous to the system. For example, knowing that
the insecure system directly couples measurements from the velocimeter with actuation
of the rotors, makes it an easy task to destruct the system faster than a type A attacker.
24
3.3. SecUAV
3.3.3.2. Pre-defined attacks
Pre-defined attacks are limited to 6 types, split in two parts in an attempt to provide
enough functionality to cover a vast set of possible applications. While the pseudocode
for this module is described in Algorithm 1, the attacks of the first part are:
 A constant and customizable offset that is being added to sensor readings or actuator
commands.
 A ramp with customizable slope.
 A seesaw with variable amplitude and frequency/slope.
Either one of these, or none, can be added to the second part of the attacks, which are:
 A Uniform distribution with customizable mean and variance.
 A Gaussian distribution with variable mean and variance.
 A Pareto distribution, characterized by scale and shape parameters, as an example
of a heavy-tailed distribution.
The parameters of the distributions and signals in the first part can be chosen to represent
a logical attack with acceptable sensor readings/actuator commands for a given scenario.
It is further possible to choose a time-varying attack, i.e. changing types or parameters
over time, to evaluate algorithms more throughout and to model an attacker that maybe is
able to see the effect of the injected signals on the UAV, hence trying a different approach
in an attempt to fool the system.
3.3.3.3. Custom attacks
If a user wishes to deploy a custom implementation of an attack, a new ROS node needs
to be supplied to the framework. To ease the implementation of such a node, the existing
pre-defined attack node is written as generic as possible and comments have been provided
for further clarity. Once this custom implementation has been written, the name, and
possible parameters need to be introduced to a custom configuration script, which can be
based on the provided configuration for the pre-defined attacks.
3.3.4. Configuration
By now, a configuration script has been mentioned several times, which shall now be
explained in detail. In an attempt to keep the complexity minimal for the user, a simple
JSON file is used to configure the framework, as can be seen in Algorithm 2.
The sample shows the configuration options for adding time-varying attacks on links. The
fields have the following meaning:
 links: This is the overall array of link objects. One entry in the array corresponds
to one link in the simulation and is composed of all other fields explained below.
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Algorithm 1 : Pre-defined attack algorithm, attacks can be chosen from two categories
or none at all
procedure addattack(x, t, type1, type2, A, f , µ, σ)
xtmp = x
switch type1 do
case 1:
xtmp = xtmp + A
case 2:
xtmp = xtmp + t× f
case 3:
xtmp = xtmp + seesaw (t, A, f)
case default:
// do nothing
switch type2 do
case 1:
xtmp = xtmp + uniform (µ , σ)
case 2:
xtmp = xtmp + gauss (µ , σ)
case 3:
xtmp = xtmp + pareto (µ , σ)
case default:
// do nothing
return xtmp
end procedure
 topicIn: Considering the case of the forward-path being under attack (c.f. Fig-
ure 3.5), this is the name of the topic the sensor under attack publishes its data
to.
 topicOut: The topic on which the attacked signal shall be published on. This is
also the topic to which the user node(s) or CPS algorithm has to subscribe to, to
get the attacked values.
 msgType: The type (i.e. format) of the messages published by the sensor. The
same message format will be used to publish the attacked signal.
 attacks: The attacks being deployed on the specified link are configured in this
array.
 tFrom: This field specifies the starting time step from which on the specific entry
shall take effect.
 tTo: The duration of the attack on the link is defined in this field. All time durations
correspond to time-steps, i.e. calls of the attack procedure in Algorithm 1.
 type1, type2: Specify the type of attack being used in the defined time frame. If
no attack is wished, these fields need to be set to i /∈ [1, 3].
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 A, f, mu, sigma: Lastly, the configuration of the various attack types is specified
by these parameters, their effect is as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 : Sample JSON configuration for adding a time-varying attack on one link
{
” l i n k s ” : [
{
” t o p i c I n ” : ”/uav1/meas/ l a s e r 1 ” ,
” topicOut ” : ”/uav1/meas/ attack / l a s e r 1 ” ,
”msgType” : ” sensor msgs /Range ” ,
” a t tacks ” : [
{
”tFrom” : 0 ,
”tTo” : 60 ,
” type1 ” : 1 ,
”A” : 2 . 5 ,
” f ” : 0 ,
” type2 ” : 2 ,
”mu” : 0 ,
” sigma” : 1
} ,
{
”tFrom” : 60 ,
”tTo” : 120 ,
” type1 ” : 2 ,
”A” : 0 ,
” f ” : 0 . 5 ,
” type2 ” : 1 ,
”mu” : 0 ,
” sigma” : 1
} ,
{
”tFrom” : 120 ,
”tTo” : 180 ,
” type1 ” : 4 ,
”A” : 0 ,
” f ” : 0 ,
” type2 ” : 4 ,
”mu” : 0 ,
” sigma” : 0
}
]
}
]
}
If the user chooses to use a custom attack on any link, it can simply be skipped in
the configuration (i.e. not include the affected links in the configuration file). Potential
configurations for custom attacks can be based on the framework, enabling to keep the
architecture simple and complexity low.
In the specific case shown in Algorithm 2, the link of laser1 is attacked (”/uav1/meas/laser”)
and the attacked signal is published on ”/uav1/meas/attack/laser1”, while the message
is of type ”sensor msgs/Range”. For the first 60 time steps, a Gaussian distribution with
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zero mean and variance of 1 will be applied to which a constant term of 2.5 is added.
The next 60 time steps apply a ramp with slope 0.5 and a uniform distribution with zero
mean and a variance of 1. The attacker chooses to not apply an attack for the last 60
time steps, as both types are set to 4 (hence outside the range [1, 3]).
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In an attempt to show the capabilities and limitations of the proposed CPS framework,
three secure state estimation algorithms are deployed on the different use cases. The
results will be used to fairly compare the three algorithms in Chapter 5.
As the test cases are based on a localization problem, papers are targeted which are able
to handle nonlinear problem formulations. However, as there is currently a very limited
selection of such papers, the third work considered in this thesis is based on a linear
system, for which the linear approach, described in Chapter 2, will be used.
4.1. Secure State Estimation with Application to
Localization and Time Synchronization (SecSens)
SecSens [36] is a collection of two secure CPS algorithms, SecEKF and SecOPT. Either
of these two algorithms can be used and deployed separately, depending on the needs
of the secure state estimator. SecSens can deal with type A and type B attacks, and is
based on an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) [37] (SecEKF) as well as an optimization
problem (SecOPT). While SecSens can be used for different applications, the focus of
the authors was to provide a framework for localization and time synchronization in a
hostile environment. Although the algorithm(s) will be explained as the Alanwar et al.
intended, they are only used for localization based problems, as time synchronization is
not an applicable problem in OpenUAV1. SecOPT and SecEKF have been implemented
for this thesis and shall be explained in the following subsections after providing a general
overview of the framework as a whole.
4.1.1. Problem statement
SecSens considers a secure state estimation problem over a network of N nodes k ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1} spatially distributed in space. Further, two nodes are considered connected
if they can communicate with each other directly. The neighborhood of a node k is denoted
by Nk. This nonlinear, time-varying system under attack is modeled as
1In order to set up a time synchronization test case, different nodes of the scenario would need to have
separate clock sources, which, due to the nature of ROS, is not the case for OpenUAV. It should be
noted that it would be possible to implement such a test case in OpenUAV though, although requiring
additional work (such as the extended ROS version Apollo is using) which is out of the scope of this
thesis.
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x˜ki+1 = f˜
(
x˜ki
)
+ n˜ki
yk,ji = h
j
(
x˜ki , x˜
j
i
)
+ v˜ki + a
k,j
i
, (4.1)
where x˜ki+1 is the state of node k and y
k,j
i is the measurement sent to node k from node
j ∈ Nk at time i. f˜ : Rn → Rn and hj : Rn → Rm are the state- and output update
functions, respectively. The process and measurement noise are denoted by zero-mean
Gaussian random variables n˜ki and v˜
k
i , where Qi and Ri are the process noise and the
measurement noise covariance matrices at time i, respectively. The attack vector ak,ji is a
vector that models how an attacker changes the sensor measurements at time i between
node j and k. This enables modeling of a malicious node k and a corrupt link (k, j). Non-
zero elements in the vector ak,ji correspond to the attacked values on the corresponding
sensor; otherwise the measurement is not attacked.
4.1.2. Core idea
Instead of identifying links under attack and excluding them from the estimation, which is
a highly complex combinatorial problem, SecSens reduces the number of observed nodes
(and hence possible attacks) at time i to the set of active nodes communicating with each
other. This drastically reduces the complexity and allows SecSens to operate in real time
as the number of unknowns equals the number of nodes. With this idea in mind, the
model (4.1) is extended with xki =
[
x˜k
T
i a
kT
i
]T
, yielding
xki+1 = f
(
xki
)
+ nki
yk,ji = h
j
(
xki ,x
j
i
)
+ vki
. (4.2)
It is important to note, that aki+1 = a
k
i are considered constant in this model, time varying
aspects of an attack are considered to be included in nki . Further, SecSens differs between:
 Outliers: Readings which lie outside the expected target range (e.g. a reading of
100 m in a 5 m × 5 m box) are detected and rejected (i.e. not considered) for the
estimation.
 Smart attacks: If readings are well inside the boundaries set by the system, they
cannot be removed by an outlier detector. A smart attacker would therefore inject
values within these limits.
This concept allows further simplification of the problem, as outliers do not have to be
considered in the secure state estimation algorithms.
SecSens assumes to be able to measure time difference and distance between moving nodes
in conjunction with measurement noise2. The measurement vector at node k, from node
2As mentioned in the introduction of this section, SecSens considers simultaneous time synchronization
and localization as a prime example of its capabilities. It is however explicitly mentioned, that it is
able to handle other applications, or a subset of the presented ones. Therefore being a good candidate
for the work conducted in this thesis.
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j ∈ Nk is composed as
yk,ji =
dk,ji + aokirk,ji + adki
Rk,ji + ad
k
i
 , (4.3)
where dk,ji denotes the counter difference at time i, which is the measured difference be-
tween the clocks of each node. Further, rk,ji represents the frequency bias discrepancies,
modeled by a single-sided two-way range between nodes k and j. Lastly, Rk,ji is a sec-
ond distance measurement between the two nodes based on three exchanged messages –
therefore more accurate then rk,ji , formally called double-sided two-way range – at time
i. The attacks on these three measurements are modeled in aoki and ad
k
i on the counter
difference and distance, respectively.
The state of node k at time i is
xki =

pki
oki b
k
i
aoki
adki
 , (4.4)
where pk
T
i is the three dimensional position of node k at time i, o
k
i denotes the clock offset
and bki the clock frequency bias; both with respect to the global reference time clock.
The full network state is considered a concatenation of the states of all nodes, i.e.
xi =
[
x0
T
i , . . . , x
N−1T
i
]T
. (4.5)
Both, SecEKF and SecOPT make use of these definitions of y and x, as will be seen in
the remainder of this section.
4.1.3. SecEKF
The first algorithm in this collection, SecEKF, relies on the use of an EKF to estimate the
true network state and corresponding attacks. It is assumed that the clock parameters
evolve according to the first-order affine approximation of the following dynamics oki+1 =
oki + b
k
i δt and b
k
i+1 = b
k
i , with δt := tM (i+ 1)− tM (i) where tM is the root node time (i.e.
global time). Further, the process update function f is defined as
f
(
xki
)
=

pki
oki + b
k
i δt
bki
aoki
adki
 . (4.6)
31
4. Secure state estimation algorithms
The measurement update function hj for any given node k with respect to a second node
j is given by
hj
(
xki ,x
j
i
)
=

(
oji − oki
)
+ aoki(
1 + bki
) ‖pji − pki ‖2 + adki(
1 + bki
) ‖pji − pki ‖2 + adki
 . (4.7)
Based on these definitions, an EKF has been designed, seeking to minimize the mean-
square error E‖xi − xˆi‖2, where xˆi is the current estimate of xi. The algorithm itself
follows three steps:
1. Reception of measurement: The estimation server has received a new measure-
ment after time step i which is a result of a message exchange between nodes k and
j, which terminates at j. This exchange may be subject to an attack, or one of the
nodes is compromised.
2. Calculation of δt: The server maintains an estimate of the master time tM (i) as
well as the time offsets and frequency biases of all nodes. Therefore, it is able to
calculate the time elapsed in between measurements in the master time frame.
3. Time update: The current estimates of time and location for each node are up-
dated while taking possible attacks under consideration.
4.1.4. SecOPT
The second algorithm in the collection is based on a Maximum Likelihood Estimator
(MLE), which is formulated as
argmin
xˆki ,a
k
i ∀k,j
∑
j,k
i′∈[i−L,i]
(
‖hj (xki′ ,xji′)− yk,ji′ ‖2 − λ ‖aki′‖1) , (4.8)
where the observed time window is of length L, i.e. L measurements are considered in
each estimation step. In order to achieve a more robust attack estimation, the L1-norm
is taken of the attack values. The complete algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3 and
is supposed to be deployed to a centralized location (e.g. server), like SecEKF. For i = 0
the state is initialized with xinit = 0n whereas all subsequent runs take the previous state
estimate as an initial point.
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Algorithm 3 : SecOPT
Set i = 0 and xˆ0 = xinit
Step 1: Collect enough measurements to fill the window.
Step 2: Solve the centralized optimization problems
[
oˆji+1 pˆ
j
i+1 aˆo
j
i+1
]
= argmin
oji p
j
i ao
j
i
∑
j∈Nk
(
dk,ji −
(
oki − oji
)− ‖pki − pji‖2/c− aoji)2 + λ ‖aoji‖1 ,[
pˆji+1 aˆd
j
i+1
]
= argmin
bji p
j
i ad
j
i
∑
j∈Nk
(
Rk,ji − ‖pki − pji‖2 − adji
)2
+ λ ‖adji‖1 .
Step 3: Increment i by one, go to Step 1.
4.2. Resilient Cyber Physical Systems Against
Adversarial Sensor Attacks (ReCaP)
ReCaP [1]3 is another secure CPS algorithm that utilizes addition of deterministic noise
to the measurements, it is making use of [38,39] and can deal with both type A and type
B attacks. Unlike other algorithms introduced in this chapter, ReCaP aims to provide
attack-free sensor measurements as a service to whatever industrial firmware is deployed
on the CPS. In other words, an additional layer is added to the system, completely
decoupling security and functionality (c.f. Figure 4.1). This approach enables quick
implementation into a system without altering anything in the firmware, it further allows
to keep the secure state estimation simple as will be shown later.
4.2.1. Problem statement
Similar to SecSens (in (4.2)), the system considered here is modeled as
xi+1sys = Fsys(xisys) + nisys
yisys = Hsys(xisys) + visys + aisys
, (4.9)
where xisys is the state and yisys is the measurements vector out of the attacked sensors
at time i. Fsys : Rn → Rn and Hsys : Rn → Rm are the state- and output update function,
respectively. The process and measurement noise are denoted by zero-mean Gaussian
random variables nisys and visys , where Qisys and Risys are the process noise and the
measurement noise covariance matrices at time i, respectively. The attack vector aisys is a
vector that models how an attacker changes the sensor measurements at time i. Non-zero
elements in the vector aisys correspond to the attacked values on the corresponding sensor;
otherwise the measurement is not attacked.
3Note that the development and evaluation of ReCaP was part of the work conducted during the course
of this thesis.
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Figure 4.1.: ReCaP equips CPS with a protection layer that aims to protect industrial
firmwares from sensor reading attacks. Industrial firmwares are designed
to deal only with noisy sensor measurements, not attacked ones. In the
depicted case, all sensors are under a time-varying attack ai. The corrupted
measurements yi are fed to ReCaP. Then, ReCaP provides attack-free sensor
readings to the industrial firmware at each time step i.
4.2.2. Core idea
The core idea is, that ReCaP makes use of the fact that some sensors can produce corre-
lated measurements, for example a distance measurement is correlated with both, velocity
and acceleration measurements. Thus, p sensors of the CPS yielding correlated signals
are grouped in m sensor groups SG1, SG2, ..SGm. Additionally, a sensor group may only
consist of a single sensor (p = 1) and can be part of multiple sensor groups (e.g. a ve-
locity sensor can be part of one sensor group of distance sensors and another of velocity
measurements). Collecting multiple sensors into a group. Note that p is not constant over
all sensor groups, i.e. different groups may be composed of a different number of sensors.
The following new state spaces (as seen in Figure 4.2) are proposed:
1. State Space per Sensor Group j: The secure state estimators’ state space may
be different for each sensor group. It defines the relationship between the sensor
measurements in the group and takes attacks into account. For example, different
types of distance sensors (laser, LiDAR, RADAR) have different noise floors. Fur-
ther, it may be necessary to apply a prior transformation to some measurements –
as shown in [40] – in order to yield the desired signal. For example, a camera may
be used to get a distance measurement as well, but in this case the camera feed
needs to be transformed before yielding in a distance measurements. This would be
the state space for the gray box in Figure 4.2
x˜i+1
Gj
= F˜Gj x˜i
Gj
+ n˜i
Gj
yi
Gj
= H˜Gj x˜i
Gj
+ v˜i
Gj
+ ai
Gj
. (4.10)
2. State Space for CPS: The state space of the CPS (i.e. the firmware) does not
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consider attacks anymore, as the measurements are considered secured by (4.10)
already when reaching it. It further holds all nonlinearities, usually modeled by
a mature state estimator dealing only with bounded noise and no attacks – e.g.
an extended Kalman filter. ReCaP does not require modification to the original
state estimators in the current industrial firmware which is the green box shown in
Figure 4.2
xi+1se = Fse (xise) + nise
yise = Hse (xise) + vise
. (4.11)
Figure 4.2.: Sensors are categorized into groups of sensors which are reporting correlated
physical signals. LiDAR, sonar, camera and RADAR sensors can be used to
measure the distance between cars which are complex CPS. The green box
corresponds to the green box in Figure 4.1 and the same for the gray ones.
The state spaces (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) are related by
 The secure measurements from all sensor groups are concatenated to build the secure
state yise =
[
x˜iG1 , . . . , x˜iGm
]T
of the CPS state estimator in the industrial firmware.
 The system state in (4.9) is equal to the one in (4.11) and the attacked measurements
in (4.10) are the same as the overall attacked measurements in (4.9), i.e. xisys = xise
and yisys =
[
yiG1 , . . . ,yiGm
]T
, respectively.
The exact algorithm is going to be described in the following, in order to ease the under-
standing it will be described for the one sensor group case, i.e. m = 1, however p ≥ 1.
Therefore the subscript Gj will be removed where there is no confusion, yielding in the
simplified state space model for one sensor group
x˜i+1 = F˜ x˜i + n˜i
yi = H xi + v˜i + ai
, (4.12)
35
4. Secure state estimation algorithms
with the state per sensor group x˜i ∈ Rn at time step i, with process noise ni and state
dynamics F˜ ∈ Rn×n. In each time step, p sensor readings yi ∈ Rp are taken. A sensor
attack is modeled as an additive attack vector ai ∈ Rp along with a sensor noise signal
v˜i.
4.2.3. Algorithm
After having discussed the basic idea of ReCaP, the framework itself is introduced in the
following. Before explaining the core concepts, a new state-space model is introduced
and attacks are classified. Further, in an attempt to make the notation clear in an easily
grasped way, it is explained using a test case where a UAV is trying to locate itself in
a room equipped with 4 anchor nodes, each time step a distance measurement to each
anchor is made and its location is triangulated (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3.: The ReCaP framework uses the environmental prior knowledge of CPS to ini-
tially classify the compromised sensor measurements. Classifying the sensor
measurement as outlier or smart-attack value.
4.2.3.1. Attack classification and modeling
Before finally discussing the main algorithm, attacks are classified and the final state-space
model before the secure state estimator is introduced.
Attack classification
Sensor readings in ReCaP can be classified as one of three categories:
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1. Noisy readings: No real system results in perfectly accurate readings, no matter
how good the sensor is, a measurement will always be subject to noise. In the exam-
ple shown in Figure 4.3, this type of readings correspond to the distance between the
UAV and its surroundings (e.g. a wall). The ultra-wideband (UWB) transceiver [41]
used in the simulations throughout this work for example, can be used to obtain a
distance with an accuracy of less than 0.5 m, which means that this sensors’ noise
has a standard deviation of less than 0.5 m.
2. Outlier readings: Usually, it is possible to define clear boundaries in which a
sensor reading has to lie. For example Figure 4.3 shows a relaxed boundary (to
allow for some measurement noise) of 24 m, if a sensor reports a measurement that
is above this boundary, it is considered an outlier (i.e. not plausible).
3. Smart attack readings: Readings under this category are under attack, however
they are well within the boundaries set by the environment and sensor datasheets
and are therefore plausible to the system.
Considering this, an attacker of type A would try to not inject outlier readings in order
to aid his aim of not being detected. Attacker B on the other hand does not hesitate to
produce readings that are well outside of the defined boundaries.
ReCaP can protect against both types of attacks according to its capabilities. Since outlier
readings are easy to detect and therefore require different treatment than smart attacks,
ReCaP is designed in a two stage way, one dealing with outliers and one with smart attack
values. The authors emphasize that outlier detection is not the main problem in their
work and therefore, exact boundaries are not necessary. This rather functions as a first
stage before heading for the main algorithm.
Attack modeling
In order to detect smart attacks and secure the system state against them, the secure
state estimator’s state space consists of the CPS state as well as an estimate for the
attack values(s). Alanwar et al. therefore use an augmented state vector in the form
xi = [x˜
T
i , a
T
i ]
T, giving the modified state-space model
xi+1 = F xi + ni
yi = H xi + vi
. (4.13)
Furthermore, in order to deal with time-varying attacks, ai+1 = ai + ni, factoring the
variance in the attack in the model noise term ni (as was confirmed in [42,43]). Lastly,
ReCaP has no restriction on the statistics of ni and vi.
4.2.3.2. The two-layered algorithm
To include both types of attackers and to yield in a robust secure state estimator, the
authors consider an attacker capable of producing outlier and smart attack values alike.
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The adversary further is able to attack k = p sensors of a sensor group (i.e. all sensors)
with k being the number of attacked sensors and p the total number of sensors. Therefore,
at any given time step, ko outlier and ka smartly attacked readings are reported, with
k = ko + ka.
This allows a classification of sensors at each time step i into a subset of sensors po
reporting outliers and a subset of sensors pa which are not reporting outliers. This means
that, since p = po + pa, it is possible that not all pa sensors are under attack, but only
subject to noise, the same may be said for outlier readings. ReCaP deals with both these
subsets in two layers, which are going to be explained in the remainder of this section.
Intrusion Detector
The first layer is composed of any light-weight intrusion detection scheme, utilizing knowl-
edge available to the public (e.g. datasheets, characteristics of the environment the CPS
is deployed in, etc.). The main goal is to enforce the bounds (yτj henceforth) discussed in
Section 4.2.3.1 and shown in Figure 4.3.
Algorithm 4 : Pseudo-code of the used outliers detector
Collect p measurements from the p sensors to construct yi.
while i < END do
temp = [ ]
for j = 1 : p do
if |yji | < yτj then
temp = [temp ; yji ]
end if
end for
yi = temp
pa = size(temp)
if pa > 1 then
Send yi to Algorithm 6. The size of the parameters is adapted according to pa.
else
Send yi to Algorithm 7.
end if
end while
The intrusion detector used in ReCaP, which can be replaced by any other real time state
of the art detector, is summarized in Algorithm 4 and is a simple threshold detector. If
the measurement yji of sensor j at time i lies outside the bounds defined before (i.e. if
|yji | > yτj), then it is filtered out and not used anymore for the current estimation step in
the second layer.
Therefore, if no attacker or only attacks of type A are present at time step i, then yi has
full size p, contrary, if attacks of type B are present or a sensor reports outlier readings,
the size of yi is pa ≤ p. It has to be emphasized, that the resulting yi does not need to
reflect the bound extremely accurate, ReCaP can handle a loose interpretation as well.
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Secure State Estimator
The second stage of ReCaP is optimization based over a sliding window Ni at time step
i and of size w, which is composed of the measurements from a sensor group that have
passed the first stage.
The algorithm makes use of several mechanisms and transformations in order to provide
secure estimates to the CPS, these are highlighted in the remainder of this section.
The first idea is the use of an adaptive initial point, an attacker may changes their
strategy over time, therefore considering previous estimate xˆi−1 as the initial point in the
current time step is not always the best way to go and may delays convergence. Choosing
an arbitrary initial point (e.g. zero) each time step, however, may be counterproductive
as well, as the history of the estimates may carries vital information. As described by
Algorithm 5, a reasonable x0 is picked by comparing difference of the standard deviation
σNi of the current window Ni with the standard deviation of the previous window Ni−1
to a threshold for changing strategies, στ1 .
Algorithm 5 : Get Ω and initial x0 at the beginning, i.e., i = 0.
Step 1: initialize the xˆ = 0p.
Step 2: Start by preparing a temporary vector tmp of size pa with some perturbation
weights.
for j = 1 to pa, stepsize 2 do
tmpj= tmpj + j δ
tmpj+1= tmpj+1 - j δ
end for
Step 3: Initialize the rotating weights Ω which is a matrix of size w × pa by rotating
the temporary vector along the window of measurements.
for u = 1 to w, stepsize 1 do
Ω: ,u = tmp
tmp= [ tmppa ; tmp1 ; ... ; tmppa−1] // rotate tmp
end for
The main concept of ReCaP is the use of rotating multiplicative weights which are
used to corrupt the measurements received from Algorithm 4. The weights Ω act as
consistent perturbations, letting the optimizer choose not to follow the attacked readings.
While constant noise would only increase the secure estimation error, consistent perturba-
tions help the optimizer to aim for a better solution as it trusts these readings less. This
is a method borrowed from machine learning [44], where it is widely used. This results
in the following convex optimization problem for securely estimating the state out of the
sensor readings (c.f. Algorithm 6)
argmin
xi
∑
j∈Ni
‖Ω: ,j • y
j
−H xi‖2 . (4.14)
The last concept used aims to defend against duty cycled attacks, where an attacker
chooses to inject a periodic attack signal with breaks in between repetitions consisting of
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Algorithm 6 : The proposed secure state estimator per sensor group G with pa > 1
Step 1: Collect multiple yi from Algorithm 4 to fill the measurements window Ni.
Step 2: Get appropriate initial point xinit for the optimizer for time step i and initialize
Ω if i == 0.
if i == 0 then,
Go to Algorithm 5.
else
if |σNi − σNi−1| > στ1 then
xinit = 0p
else
xinit = xˆi−1
end if
end if
Step 3: Solve one of the following optimization problems:
if σNi > στ2 then
xˆi = argmin
xi
∑
j∈Ni
‖Ω: ,j • y
j
−H xi‖2
subject to xlb < xi < xub
else
xˆi = argmin
xi
∑
j∈Ni
‖yj −H xi‖2 + λ‖ai‖1
subject to xlb < xi < xub
end if
no attacks but only sensor readings. This attempt shall fool the estimator and ultimately
yield in an undesired state. ReCaP aims to detect such periods (i.e. a window suffering
a smart attack and one which does not), by taking a look at the standard deviation σNi
of the window Ni and comparing it to a (small) threshold στ2 .
In the case that all sensors agree on the same reading within the noise bounds4, this
threshold is not met, indicating that the sensors are currently not under attack. There-
fore ReCaP can utilize a different optimization problem in an attempt to enhance the
estimation results. Hence, ReCaP solves either of the two optimization problems (solved
in Algorithm 6)
xˆi =
{
argminxi
∑
j∈Ni ‖Ω: ,j • yj −H xi‖2, if σNi > στ2
argminxi
∑
j∈Ni ‖yj −H xi‖2 + λ‖ai‖1, else
. (4.12)
4Note that this could also mean that all sensors suffer an attack which simply adds the same constant
(i.e. ai = [c, c, ..., c]
T with c ∈ R\0), in this case not enough side information is available to extract
the true value of the readings. In other words, this constitutes the impossible problem for which
there currently exists no solution to securely estimate the state correctly.
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Further, since Algorithm 4 may only forwards a single reading to the second stage
(pa = 1 but p > 1) or because p = pa = 1, it is necessary to provide an alternate
formulation to Algorithm 6. In this case, Algorithm 7 is deployed, as there is only a single
sensor reading available, there is no need for rotating weights, however, multiple sensors
are simulated, by dividing the long window w in sub windows of size wsub on which the
perturbations are applied. Note that in case of an attack of type B, the attacker may
choose to apply an attack that results in pa = 0, in this case ReCaP cannot guarantee an
acceptable estimation error and this is considered a total denial of service attack.
Algorithm 7 : Pseudo-code of the proposed secure state stator per sensor group G with
pa = 1
Step 1: Collect multiple yi from Algorithm 4 to fill the measurements window Ni. The
size of yi would be one as pa = 1.
Step 2: Divide the long window w of measurement to sub-windows of size wsub where
wsub << w.
tmpj = [yi; yi+1; ...; yi+wsub ]
yj = tmp;
Step 3: Adapt the algorithm parameters like H to the new size of measurements by
combining multiple in a column.
Step 4: Get appropriate initial point xinit for the optimizer for time step i and initialize
Ω if i == 0.
if i == 0 then,
Go to Algorithm 5.
else
if |σNi − σNi−1| > στ1 then
xinit = 0p
else
xinit = xi−1
end if
end if
Step 5: Solve one of the optimization problems:
if σNi > στ2 then
xˆi = argmin
xi
∑
j∈Ni
‖Ω: ,j • y
j
−H xi‖2
subject to: xlb < xi < xub
else
xˆi = argmin
xi
∑
j∈Ni
‖y
j
−H xi‖2 + λ‖ai‖1
subject to: xlb < xi < xub
end if
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4.3. Robustness of Attack-resilient State Estimators
(RARSE)
Pajic et al. [45] propose a secure CPS algorithm not only on the assumption of noise (and
attacks) but also aim to tackle the problem of a not perfectly accurate system model.
The main restriction of this work is, that it deals with a linear system model; therefore
the linear localization described in Section 2.2.3 will be used to fairly compare it with the
other two approaches discussed.
4.3.1. Problem statement
This approach considers a Linear-Time Invariant (LTI) system in the form
xk+1 = A xk + B uk + vi
yk = C xk + wk + ek
, (4.10)
where xk ∈ Rn and uk ∈ Rm correspond to the systems state and input vector at time
k, respectively. Further, yk ∈ Rp corresponds to the measurements taken from the set
of p sensors S = {s1 , . . . , sp}. Additionally, vk ∈ Rn and wk ∈ Rp model process-
and measurement noise, respectively, while ek represents the attack vector at time k. It is
assumed that the sensors included in the set K = {1 , 2 , . . . , p} are under attack, therefore
ek,i = 0∀KC and k ≥ 0. Note that KC = S\K, therefore supp (ek) ⊆ K ,∀ k ≥ 0.
It has been shown in [46], that the optimal secure estimate of (4.10) – in the lack of noise,
i.e. vk = 0n and wk = 0p – is given by
xˆ = argmin
xˆ∈Rn
‖Yt,N − φN (x)‖l0 , (4.11)
utilizing the lastN measurements (yt−N+1 , . . . ,yt) and actuator inputs (ut−N+1 , . . . ,ut−1).
Further, the matrix Yt,N ∈ Rp×N , formed by
Yt,N =
[
y˜t−N+1
∣∣y˜t−N+2∣∣ . . . ∣∣y˜t] ,
represents the collection of the last N sensor measurements with
y˜k = yk , for k = t−N + 1
y˜k = yk −
k−t+N−2∑
i=0
C Ai B uk−1−i , for k ≥ t−N + 2 . (4.12)
Additionally, the system’s evolution over the last N steps is captured in the linear mapping
φN (x) : Rn → Rp×N which is defined as
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φN (x) =
[
C x
∣∣C A x∣∣ . . . ∣∣C AN−1 x] .
Finally, the history of the last N attacks is represented by Et,N = Yt,N −φN (x) ∈ Rp×N ,
with
Et,N =
[
et−N+1
∣∣et−N+2∣∣ . . . ∣∣et] .
Therefore, entries equal to zero in Et,N correspond to non attacked sensors at the corre-
sponding time steps, while zero rows indicate that a sensor has not been attacked in the
observed time frame. Furthermore, the estimator shown in (4.10) can recover the system’s
state after N time steps when a maximum of q sensors are under attack, if and only if
(iff) ∀x ∈ R\0
∣∣supp (C x) ∪ supp (C A x) ∪ · · · ∪ supp (C AN−1 x)∣∣ > 2q . (4.13)
Lastly, the maximum number of attacked sensors, such that the state x can be recovered,
is denoted by qmax, which depends on N , A and C. Hence, if q ≤ qmax, the minimal l0
norm of (4.11) of a noiseless system is equal to q.
4.3.2. Attack-resilient state estimator
Real systems usually suffer from noise and, in some cases, modeling errors, hence, due to
the simplified assumptions, the secure state estimator from (4.11) can only be used in a
very limited manner. For example, if the noise terms indicate an attack on more than
qmax sensors, the condition for correct operation is violated.
For simplicity reasons it is assumed that uk = 0m for k ≥ 0 in the remainder of this section.
Further the subscripts from Yt,N , Et,N and φN (x) are dropped as the case t = N − 1
is considered, meaning that x0 is estimated. It is further assumed that
∣∣K∣∣ ≤ qmax and∣∣wk∣∣  wk as well as ∣∣vk∣∣  vk for k = 0 , . . . , N − 1. Therefore, the matrix
Yw,v =
[
y0
∣∣y1∣∣ . . . ∣∣yN−1] ,
contains the measurements including noise. Lastly, the noiseless version of Yw,v is given
by
Y¯ =
[
y¯0
∣∣y¯1∣∣ . . . ∣∣y¯N−1] .
This allows to define the optimization problem
P0 (Y) : min
E,x
‖E‖l0
s.t.: E = Y − φ (x)
, (4.14)
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therefore
(x0,E) = argmax P0
(
Y¯
)
, (4.15)
with q = ‖E‖l0 ≤ qmax. Since the actual system does not have access to the ideal,
noiseless, matrix Y¯, a relaxation of (4.14) is necessary to be able to deal with Yw,v. This
is achieved by
P0,∆ (Y) : min
E,x
‖E‖l0
s.t.: |Y − φ (x)− E| ∆
, (4.16)
where ∆ ∈ Rp×N contains the tolerances δj,i for each sensor si, i = 1 , . . . , p, i.e.
∆ =
[
δ0
∣∣δ1∣∣ . . . ∣∣δN−1] .
Hence
(x0,∆ ,E0,∆) = argmax P0,∆ (Yw,v)
q∆ = ‖E‖l0
. (4.17)
Lastly, it is important to initialize ∆ appropriately, so that P0,∆ (Y) has a feasible point
(x0,∆ ,E0,∆) such that ‖E‖l0 ≤ qmax. To achieve this, the bound
|yk − y¯k| ≤ |C|
k−1∑
i=0
|Ak−1−i| |vi|+ |wk|
≤ |C|
k−1∑
i=0
|Ak−1−i| vi + wk = δk ,
, (4.18)
is specified. Therefore, there exists a feasible point (x0,∆ ,E0,∆) for P0,∆ (Y) if δk  δ¯k
for k = 0 , . . . , N − 1. Meaning that q∆ = q ≤ qmax and a solution can be obtained if at
most qmax sensors are compromised.
Lastly, Pajic et al. provide an algorithm to calculate a bound in which the estimated
state lies. As this will not be used in the implementation related to this thesis, it is not
further discussed here; the interested reader is directed to [45].
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The flexibility and potentials of the proposed framework, introduced in Chapter 3, are
now studied by deploying the algorithms described in Chapter 4 in different test cases
which are discussed before presenting the results obtained by each secure state estimator.
5.1. Test cases
The different scenarios presented in this section evolve in complexity and aim to stress
both, the simulation environment and the secure state estimation algorithms. As the over-
all simulation environment, OpenUAV, deals – as explained – with UAVs as a simulated
robot, all test cases involve a number of UAVs.
It is important to note, before going into details, that the measured signals (which may be
corrupted) are directly or indirectly used as input for the flight controllers1 which control
the actuators, and ultimately the position of the UAV. Therefore, a smart attack on an
unsecured system can be used to maliciously drive the UAV to any position the adversary
would like it to go; or even crash. All range measurements conducted in this analysis
make use of a simulated UWB transceiver based on [41].
5.1.1. Test case 1
The first scenario consists of a single UAV, equipped with a laser range finder and a
wireless module, to measure the distance between the ground and eight anchor nodes at
known locations, respectively. The environment is contained within a 5 m × 5 m plane,
while the target position is at the center (2.5, 2.5) and shall be kept at all times (as can
be seen in Figure 5.1).
As described in Chapter 2, the localization is carried out in 2D. This results in a total
of 8 links (8 anchors), all of which are considered under attack by an attacker following
both, type A and type B schemes.
1The flight controllers make use of various estimators for estimating its current status (altitude, position,
etc.), a P-loop controller for reducing the positioning error and a PID-loop controller for reducing the
velocity error in order to reach the target destination quickly and correctly. For details please refer
to [34].
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x
y
Figure 5.1.: Setup for the first test case, consisting of one UAV in the center, surrounded
by eight anchors (red crosses).
5.1.2. Test case 2
In this setup, two UAVs are deployed in the same conditions as in test case one, while
one UAV still tries to remain at a given point in the environment, a second constantly
measures its own position and distance to the first UAV and tries to stay at a certain
distance from it (c.f. Figure 5.2).
x
y
d1,2
1 m
1 m
Figure 5.2.: Setup for the second test case, consisting of one UAV in the top right corner,
another one in the bottom left, constantly monitoring the distance between
both and trying to keep at a target distance from the first UAV, both are
surrounded by eight anchors (red crosses).
Therefore, on top of the 8 links identified in the first test case, 9 more – totaling 17 links
– are considered under attack in this scenario. In addition to the 8 links necessary to
control the location of the second UAV, one additional link is required for measuring the
distance between both UAVs.
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5.2. Results
All use-cases have been implemented and the secure estimators (introduced in Chapter 4)
were deployed in separate scenarios. While the attack signal on the sensors is not the
same for all simulations, the statistical characteristics is the same (e.g. the same shift and
variance values during the same periods), the attack signal used can be seen in Figure 5.3.
Here, for the first 200 time steps, the adversary chooses to add Gaussian noise with a
mean of 3 m and a variance of 2 m to the measured ranges between the anchors and the
UAV(s), the next 200 time steps are not subject to an attack in order to confuse the state
estimator, which is followed by a Gaussian noise attack with mean 4 m and a variance of
2 m in the next 200 time steps; in the last 200 time steps, the attack has a mean of 2 m
and a variance of 5 m. For the attacks on the range measurement between the UAVs, the
means are 0.5 m, 0 m, 0.9 m and 0.5 m, all with a variance of 2 m for the same periods,
respectively. The different mean values for the attack on the range measurement between
the two UAVs have been chosen because the initial position of both UAVs is relatively
close to each other, therefore it is not expected to make use of the whole simulation area.
The attack results in a few outliers which are filtered out by the intrusion detector before,
if an algorithm makes use of such.
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Figure 5.3.: The attack being applied over time on all sensors being considered under
attack.
The resulting absolute errors in terms of estimated position (test case 1 and 2) as well as
of the estimated range between the two UAVs (use case 2) are shown in Figures 5.4-5.6
and are defined as
errpos,i = ‖pˆi − pi‖2 , (5.1)
errrng = |rˆ − r| , (5.2)
where pi and pˆi are the real and estimated position of UAV i ∈ [1, 2]. Further, rˆ and r
represent the measured and actual range between the two UAVs, respectively.
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Table 5.1.: Comparison of the three secure state estimators in terms of absolute errors
and computation time. Note that the timing information provided always
corresponds to a single execution (i.e one sensor group in ReCaP, one time
step in all other algorithms).
Test Case Metric SecEKF SecOPT ReCaP RARSE
1
Mean error 0.065 0.2965 0.0356 0.8613
Std. Deviation 0.062 0.451 0.0211 0.1453
Computation time 246.07 µs 28.4 ms 56.91 ms 540.5 ms
2
Mean error UAV1 0.1129 0.2079 0.0369 0.7749
Std. Deviation UAV1 0.0596 0.1428 0.0177 0.0522
Mean error UAV2 0.0745 0.2222 0.2893 0.5092
Std. Deviation UAV2 0.044 0.1466 0.1802 0.0668
Computation time 568.06 µs 134.35 ms 59.21 ms 1.31 s
The mean and variance of the absolute errors as well as the mean time needed for com-
puting an estimate for one time step is summarized in Table 5.1.
It can be seen that all three algorithms perform reasonably well over the whole course of
the simulations, before directly and fairly comparing them with each other, the results
will be discussed individually to highlight advantages and disadvantages of each secure
state estimator.
It has to be highlighted that the focus of this work was not on high performance im-
plementations, therefore, any optimization-based algorithm does not meet the real-time
requirements set by OpenUAV. However, if computations would rely on better solvers
(currently standard SciPy solvers [47] are used) and make use of parallelization (while
running on an overall faster system), these requirements can be met (as has been demon-
strated by [36], for example).
5.2.1. SecSens
Figure 5.4 shows the corresponding performance of SecSens, as it is a collection of two
individual algorithms, the discussion is split in two parts as well.
5.2.1.1. SecEKF
The clear advantage of SecEKF over any other considered secure state estimator is, that it
is soley based on simple matrix operations which, in the studied context, do not constitute
as a ”big” problem (i.e. several hundred states to be estimated). Therefore, it is the
fastest algorithm simulated during this work. Furthermore, this fact allows SecEKF to
be deployed directly into OpenUAV without heavy optimization w.r.t. computation time.
The resulting absolute errors remain low throughout the tests and the attacks are filtered
out efficiently. It can be seen that it performs equally good in both test cases, indicating
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Figure 5.4.: Simulation results for SecEKF (blue) and SecSens (red), the absolute local-
ization error for test case 1 (a) and the absolute errors in terms of the location
of UAV1 (b) and the range in between UAV1 and UAV2 (c) all show excellent
performance.
that the number of links (i.e. measurements) and states does not yield in degraded
performance, at least in the small scale.
5.2.1.2. SecOPT
Similar to SecEKF, SecOPT performs well within the expected boundaries for a localiza-
tion problem. Due to its nature (optimization based), the run-time suffers as the imple-
mentation was not optimized for speed and standard solvers have been used. Therefore,
the secure estimates have been carried out oﬄine by firstly collecting the measurements
from OpenUAV, attacking them and feeding SecOPT with them. Afterwards, the secure
estimates have been used as new way points for a second simulation in OpenUAV, showing
its performance. This has been done for both test cases.
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Figure 5.5.: Simulation results for ReCaP, the absolute localization error for test case 1
(a) and the absolute errors in terms of the location of UAV1 (b) and the range
in between UAV1 and UAV2 (c) all show excellent performance.
5.2.2. ReCaP
The big advantage of ReCaP is the effort needed to implement it on top of an, already
in place, industrial firmware. In this specific case, the underlying firmware was an EKF
which estimates the position(s) of the UAVs based on the secure measurements provided
from ReCaP. As every sensor group needs its own instance of ReCaP, the computation
time suffers (m vs 1 optimization problems need to be solved each time step). The
overall performance however, is – again – within reasonable bounds for these problems
(c.f. Figure 5.5).
5.2.3. RARSE
Lastly, the attack-resilient state estimator has been deployed for both test cases. As it
cannot handle non-linear problems, the linearization technique described in Chapter 2
has been used to linearize the problem. As this linearization is not a perfect solution and,
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Figure 5.6.: Simulation results for RARSE, the absolute localization error for test case
1 (a) and the absolute errors in terms of the location of UAV1 (b) and the
range in between UAV1 and UAV2 (c) all show excellent performance.
in itself, subject to error, the absolute errors for this secure state estimator are higher as
well, but still well within any boundaries (see Figure 5.6). Again, the estimation utilizes
an optimization based method, therefore computations have been carried out oﬄine. It
has to be noted, that not all links have been under attack, as RARSE has an upper limit
(qmax) on the number of attacked links.
5.3. Fair comparison
As can be seen in Figures 5.4-5.6 and Table 5.1, all implementations operate similarly well,
considering their limitations (i.e. optimization based and linearization). Naturally, Se-
cEKF provides the fastest computation time, while the non-optimized version of RARSE
takes the longest time for providing secure estimates. Nevertheless, in terms of imple-
mentation effort, ReCaP clearly stands out as the underlying system does not need to be
modified. This man-in-the-middle type of deployment enables it to be used in between
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the sensor(s) and firmware allowing rapid and simple integration. Further, SecSens and
ReCaP perform approximately equally good in terms of mean error and standard devi-
ation, while RARSE performs slightly worse in all discussed cases. However, it has to
be considered that the latter suffers from the disadvantage of having to deal with a non
linear system it has not been designed to operate with. Keeping this in mind, it still
performs comparably well to the other algorithms, therefore indicating that, if all would
operate on a linear system model, it could perform just as good as the remaining secure
state estimators. The big disadvantage of RARSE, compared to other algorithms is, that
it cannot deal with an arbitrary high number of attacked links.
Ultimately, it can be seen that each implementation has its own set of advantages and
disadvantages based upon the observed system and problem, while this could have been
said based solely on the published works by the authors, SecUAV provides a unique
opportunity to evaluate their performance on exactly the same problem. This enables
tweaking of the implementations to see if the results would change (e.g. as discussed in
the beginning of Section 5.2, focusing on parallelization and faster solvers).
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In this work, the problem of fair comparison of secure CPS state estimation algorithms
has been considered and a unified framework has been proposed. The newly introduced
SecUAV – based on OpenUAV – enables students, researchers and industry alike, to
rapidly compare multiple algorithms in a uniform setting. Therefore, allowing a fair com-
parison of different solutions to the same problem, before ultimately making a choice for a
specific problem in mind. The capabilities of this framework have been demonstrated, by
deploying three different algorithms on the same set of problems under similar conditions.
It has been shown that the proposed framework is a suitable environment for simulating
secure state estimators. Special care has to be taken however, if the algorithm is not
centralized, in tweaking the execution time, so that normal operation of the UAV(s) is
guaranteed.
Future work will focus on the completion of SecUAV as well as a fair comparison of,
at the time of completion, state of the art secure state estimators. Furthermore, it has
been shown that standard solvers of SciPy are not suitable for real time operation of the
studied algorithms, in an attempt to provide samples allowing rapid learning of using the
tool, optimized versions of the implemented algorithms will be made. Furthermore, the
possibility of a challenge, similar to the NSF Student CPS Challenge, could be possible in
the future (based on this framework), where researchers and students try to solve a given
problem with their own secure state estimators competing for the most robust system.
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A. A deep dive into OpenUAV
A.1. ROS, Gazebo, PX4 and Docker
A.1.1. Robot Operating System
ROS [29] is an open-source collection of libraries, conventions and tools meaning to provide
one common, simple to use, framework for robotic platforms. It is maintained by a
big community contributing their knowledge to the ROS ecosystem. In order to allow
maximum flexibility in terms of robot configurations, ROS has been built in a modular
and distributed design to enable usage among a wide variety of robots. The distributed
design allows that individuals contribute modules which can be invoked and used in a
given setup. Further, the modular design lets the decision on what to use up to the
developer. If someone would rather use provided modules for some sensors but needs a
custom implementation for the remaining sensors and actuators, implementing this and
integrating it with the remaining robot is easily doable without much overhead.
This modularity is mainly achieved by sub-processes called nodes, each node may resemble
one or more components of the robot (e.g. an actuator, sensor or camera) which can
publish data to the remainder of the system via a topic, which can be thought of as a
URI, allowing another node to subscribe to this topic and read the published data in
real-time (c.f. Figure A.1). The orchestration of these nodes and the robot is achieved by
a core system named Master. Furthermore, the data is published by means of messages,
which are a standardized format for inter-node communication. One main advantage
of this architecture is, that the user can control all components of a robot via a single
interface (publishing/subscribing to different topics) rather than having to deal with a
different API for each component as it is usually the case in embedded systems.
Furthermore, the MAVROS package [30] is used, which enables a higher abstraction level
of nodes and provides an interface to MAVLINK, the link used for communicating with
PX4. This allows the user to focus on the algorithmic implementation rather than having
to take care of every little detail of controlling actuators and sensors. For example, the
UAV can simply be controlled by publishing appropriate data to topics, ROS, MAVROS
and PX4 take care of the rest (e.g. control loops of the actuators and sensors).
A.1.2. Gazebo
While ROS enables researchers to create a modular software for their robots, it does not
allow to simulate the developed algorithms and procedures, Gazebo [31] was born out
of early ROS versions meaning to provide a solution to this issue. Like ROS, Gazebo
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Figure A.1.: The basic architecture of ROS, a component can be represented by one or
more nodes which publish and subscribe data to/from topics. The collection
of nodes is orchestrated by the master.
is open-source and benefits from an active community, it combines a physics engine,
graphical representation of the simulation as well as programmatic and graphical interfaces
to control the simulation and its environment. Gazebo allows its users to create a world
in which the robot moves, as well as to build a 3D model of the robot(s) being simulated.
It further provides interfaces to simulate the sensors and actuators implemented in ROS
so that they can be used in the simulation as well (e.g. cameras, laser range finders,
LiDAR).
All of this combined allows to test algorithms and scenarios before they are being ap-
plied to the actual robot, allowing rapid development and debugging in a real-life like
(regarding to physics) environment. As is the case with ROS, Gazebo was designed in
a distributed manner, a master takes care of the orchestration while the physics engine,
rendering, user interface, communication and sensor generation are being taken care of
by separate libraries, which can be thought of like the concept of nodes described earlier.
The integration of ROS with Gazebo is shown in Figure A.2, as can be seen the same
ROS implementation can be used for real world tests as well as Gazebo simulations.
A.1.3. PX4
PX4 [32] is a commercial auto pilot for robots which, as the rest of the software stack, is
open source and open-hardware. It allows the user to only have to take care of the ”big
picture” rather than every little detail. For example, the user specifies a set of way points
to which the drone shall fly, once passed to PX4, the platform takes care of actuator
control and takes sensor readings into account in order to avoid obstacles and to fly to the
specified locations. As the previous platforms, PX4 benefits from an active community
as well and offers full flexibility to modify and adapt it fully to the user’s needs. The
architecture (see Figure A.3) allows easy replacement of different blocks if they are not
needed or if the user needs to modify a block in order to work with the target application.
It further includes all necessary interfaces to control actuators and read sensors so that
the mission can be successfully finished.
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Figure A.2.: Integration of ROS and Gazebo, ROS can be simulated by Gazebo before
being deployed to the real world.
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Figure A.3.: The architecture of the PX4 flight stack.
A.1.4. Docker
Docker [33] is a container platform that enables organizations and users to rapidly build
and deploy services, platforms and more in containers. A basic use case is, among others,
Container as a Service, in this case the user is provided with a script (dockerfile) which,
when executed, creates everything necessary for the service to operate on a local Docker
ecosystem. As can be seen in Figure A.4, Docker takes care of governance, security,
authorization and orchestration of deployed containers. A container itself can be a rather
simple program running on it, or a complete operating system (e.g. Ubuntu) which in
turn is used to launch a service or process which then communicates with the remaining
containers or the outside world. This architecture allows rapid scaling and prototyping of
services, if for example, more instances of a service are needed, all that needs to be done
is to deploy more containers. The scaling – among other features – can be automated by
using Kubernetes, Ansible, or other container management software.
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Figure A.4.: The architecture of Docker [48]. An application runs in a container which,
in turn, is managed by the underlying Docker system, handling governance,
security, automation and host integration.
A.2. Capabilities
To further strengthen the reasoning behind choosing OpenUAV over CARLA and Apollo
as the basis of SecUAV, the flexibility and capabilities of OpenUAV are demonstrated by
summarizing two case studies presented by the authors of [28] and showing the feasibility
of OpenUAV for the intended use – sensory attacks.
A.2.1. Case study 1 - Machine Learning
Having been built with adaptivity in mind, OpenUAV can be extended, and make use of
various computational platforms and frameworks such as openCV [49] and tensorflow [50]
which are libraries for computer vision and machine learning, respectively. In order to
show off these capabilities, Schmittle et al. created a simulation where an UAV has to
navigate itself through a world with obstacles, such as trees, to reach a given point. This
task has been achieved by utilizing openCV to compute a depth map from the cameras
of the UAV which clearly shows any obstacles in the way of the drone. These images are
then fed to tensorflow which uses them to calculate a set of instructions for OpenUAV to
use to control the quadrotor into the right direction.
Therefore, it is possible to use external libraries in the simulation environment, enabling
many possibilities for potential test cases while keeping the complexity of the solution
low as not everything needs to be implemented by the user. The usage of openCV can
be especially useful when relying on camera feeds to get certain information (e.g. ranges
to objects) while tensorflow enables the community to further evaluate secure CPS algo-
rithms utilizing deep learning.
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A.2.2. Case study 2 - Formations
The second test case shown by the authors deals with the goal of having multiple UAVs
fly in a given formation in a leader-follower scenario. Would a challenge like this be done
using real hardware, it is likely for UAVs to crash into each other during development
of the algorithm, yielding in a very costly implementation. Further it aims to show how
easy it is to control multiple drones in a simulation, as well as the feature of utilizing
MATLAB for computations needed by the simulation. In this simulation, MATLAB is
used oﬄine to compute a set of way points for each UAV which are then fed to the
simulation environment letting each UAV fly to the specified points.
Oﬄine computations can be necessary – where applicable – if either (i) the user already
has an implementation in another context (e.g. MATLAB) and wishes to quickly test if
the effort of implementing it as a node is feasible or (ii) the algorithm is too computa-
tionally expensive for yielding results in real-time on the UAV testbed (e.g. because it is
a centralized algorithm which would usually run on a high performance back-end server).
A.2.3. NSF Student CPS Challenge
Further, OpenUAV is used during the initial phase of the NSF Student CPS Challenge [51],
in which teams of students are presented with a problem in the field of UAV research and
compete to solve it in a better way than other teams. Before the final field competition on
real hardware, the students utilize OpenUAV to simulate their ideas and solutions to find
a feasible approach to (hopefully) win the challenge. This shows how OpenUAV can be
used in education to enable students to learn concepts previously only studied on paper
or through very expensive hardware (if at all).
For the 2018 edition of the challenge, the teams were tasked with developing a system
able to scan an area for a lost aircraft (i.e. another UAV) by using a quadrotor with
downward facing camera and, if a team thinks it is required, other sensors. After locating
the broken UAV in the field, the goal is to retrieve it and bring it back to base, safely. The
teams were provided with OpenUAV as a simulation platform and support with hardware
decisions. The first round of the competition was carried out between 10 teams competing
against each other for the best simulation results in OpenUAV. Afterwards 6 teams were
selected for real life outdoor trials before heading to the finals.
A.2.4. Secure sensing
Lastly, it shall be shown that OpenUAV can be used for the target of secure sensing
and what problems are faced without a common secure CPS framework. As discussed in
Section 3.2.1.2, it is possible to provide custom algorithms and sensors into a simulation
by implementing new nodes into the system. This can, of course, be used to simulate a
test case where an UAV tries to keep a safe distance from an obstacle, e.g. a wall or the
ground, by relying on sensor readings (e.g. laser range finders).
Several nodes acting as sensors, a distance control algorithm, as well as a secure sensing
algorithm and an attacker have been implemented (the scenario is shown in Figure A.5).
59
A. A deep dive into OpenUAV
While the results are presented in Chapter 5, it can be seen that it is possible for re-
searchers and developers to implement such a test case by using OpenUAV as a basis. If
this is done without a unified approach, the result will be similar to the current state,
where everyone has a different way of attacking and/or evaluating their algorithms, there-
fore not allowing for a fair comparison.
x
y
2.5 m
Figure A.5.: Secure sensing setup to show the capabilities of OpenUAV. The UAV is trying
to consistently hover 2.5 m away from the obstacle (wall) by utilizing laser
distance measurements.
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